Economic Foundations of International Law
The ever-increasing exchange of goods and ideas among
nations, as well as cross-border pollution, global warming, and international
crime, pose urgent questions for international law. Here, two respected
scholars provide an intellectual framework for assessing these pressing legal
problems from a rational choice perspective.
The approach assumes that states are rational,
forward-looking agents which use international law to address the actions of
other states that may have consequences for their own citizens, and to obtain
the benefits of international cooperation. It further assumes that in the
absence of a central enforcement agency―that is, a world
government―international law must be self-enforcing. States must believe that
if they violate international agreements, other states will retaliate.
Consequently, Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes devote
considerable attention to the challenges of enforcing international law, which
begin with the difficulties of determining what it is. In the absence of an
international constitution, the sources for international law are vague.
Lawyers must rely on statements contained in all manner of official documents
and on simple observation of states’ behavior. This looseness leads
international institutions such as the United Nations to deliver conflicting
interpretations of the law’s most basic principles. The authors describe the
conditions under which international law succeeds or fails, across a wide range
of issues, including war crimes, human rights, international criminal law,
principles of state responsibility, law of the sea, international trade
regulation, and international investment law.