Economic Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes,
Constitutional Challenges
The Euro-Crisis and the legal and institutional
responses to it have had important constitutional implications on the
architecture of the European Union (EU). Going beyond the existing literature,
Federico Fabbrini's book takes a broad look and examines how the crisis and its
aftermath have changed relations of power in the EU, disaggregating three
different dimensions: (1) the vertical relations of power between the member
states and the EU institutions, (2) the relations of power between the
political branches and the courts, and (3) the horizontal relations of power
between the EU member states themselves.
The first part of the book argues that, in the
aftermath of the Euro-crisis, power has been shifting along each of these axes
in paradoxical ways. In particular, through a comparison of the United States,
Fabbrini reveals that the EU is nowadays characterized by a high degree of
centralization in budgetary affairs, an unprecedented level of judicialization
of economic questions, and a growing imbalance between the member states in the
governance of fiscal matters. As the book makes clear, however, each of these
dynamics is a cause for concern - as it calls into question important
constitutional values for the EU, such as the autonomy of the member states in
taking decision about taxing and spending, the preeminence of the political
process in settling economic matters, and the balance between state power and
state equality. The second part of the book, therefore, devises possible
options for future legal and institutional developments in the EU which may
revert these paradoxical trends. In particular, Fabbrini considers the ideas of
raising a fiscal capacity, restoring the centrality of the EU legislative
process, and reforming the EU executive power, and discusses the challenges
that accompany any further step towards a deeper Economic and Monetary Union.
