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volume II
terza edizione
Autori : Agostino Gambino, Daniele U. Santosuosso
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Non è la bacchetta magica, ma un moderno
sistema di valutazione può aiutare la scuola italiana a rinnovarsi, evitando i
rischi di declino. Come? Fornendo analisi per capire le debolezze del nostro
sistema d'istruzione e le ragioni dei suoi ritardi. Offrendo a ciascuna scuola
strumenti di diagnosi per fare meglio il proprio lavoro e migliorare i risultati
degli studenti. Infine, mettendo a disposizione delle famiglie efficaci bussole
per orientarsi. Ne è convinta la Fondazione Agnelli, che arriva a questo
rapporto dopo un lungo percorso di ricerca. Non mancano certo i dilemmi da
affrontare. Chi valutare? I singoli docenti, le scuole, il sistema scolastico
nel suo complesso? Con quali strumenti? Quale uso fare dei risultati della
valutazione? E, soprattutto, come costruire il consenso e guadagnare la fiducia
degli insegnanti, superandone le resistenze? Un quadro della valutazione della
scuola in Italia e le soluzioni possibili, a partire dalle evidenze che vengono
dalla ricerca, dall'esperienza internazionale e dalle sperimentazioni
nazionali.| Cerca Copia |
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What is discrimination? There are certain
instances of differential treatment that almost anyone would describe as
discriminatory; yet upon deeper examination, this near-unanimity gives way to
disagreement and difference. For instance, is it discrimination when hospitals
hire non-smokers only? Not only do people differ on which cases of differential
treatment they see as discriminatory, they also disagree about when
discrimination is morally wrong; what makes it morally wrong; and, indeed, about
whether all forms of discrimination are morally wrong! Finally, many disagree
over what should be done about wrongful discrimination-especially about what the
state could permissibly do to eliminate wrongful discrimination, e.g. in
people's love lives. This book addresses these issues. It argues that there are
different concepts of discrimination and that different purposes pertaining to
different contexts determine which one is the most useful. It gives special
attention to a concept of discrimination that ties discrimination to
differential treatment of people on the basis of their membership in socially
salient groups. Second, it argues that when discrimination is wrong, it is so
first and foremost because of its harmful effects. Third, it takes issue with
some of the standard devices used to counteract discrimination and submits that
combating discrimination requires more than state actions. Finally, it argues
that states may sometimes permissibly discriminate. "[Lippert-Rasmussen] is a
master of advancing discussion on a topic by showing that where the rest of us
saw only two or three possible positions, there are many positions, often
smeared together in a confused way in prior writings on the topic. The different
views need to be carefully distinguished, and we then need to look carefully at
what can be said for and against each in turn. When we do this, our view of the
issues significantly shifts. This method and its fruits are evident throughout
the bookEL [The] author's analytical skill and creative imagination in following
through this method make the book a pleasure to read." -Richard J. Arneson,
Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego
Las afirmaciones del tipo «matar está mal» o «Pedro debe responder por el mal
causado» suelen ser sometidas a escrutinio exigiendo su justificación. Según una
concepción arraigada en el terreno práctico y que se denomina «universalismo»,
los juicios o acciones prácticas están justificadas sólo si constituyen el
seguimiento o aplicación de un parámetro, regla o principio de cierto tipo. El
universalismo es objetado de dos maneras. Por un lado por el escepticismo, para
el cual nunca tiene sentido hablar de afirmaciones o acciones justificadas. Por
el otro por el particularismo, para el que puede hablarse de acciones o
afirmaciones justificadas aunque no impliquen la aplicación de un principio o
regla. Según el particularista ninguna regla o principio pueden ser lo
suficientemente atentos o receptivos a la complejidad de los casos sobre los que
habrá que decidir. La discusión entre universalismo, escepticismo y
particularismo se proyecta directamente en el plano del derecho. En el terreno
del derecho se puede sostener o bien que la decisión de un juez está justificada
sólo si se basa en una regla o principio general, o bien que nunca está
justificada, o bien que puede existir una justificación jurídica a pesar de que
la decisión no se base en una regla o principio. Este libro analiza la discusión
entre universalismo, escepticismo y particularismo y su proyección en la teoría
del derecho. Se pretende defender una variante del particularismo abordando en
tono crítico los postulados de la filosofía analítica clásica. Si se concede que
nuestro conocimiento es necesariamente parcial y algunas veces verdadero, y se
acepta la existencia de libertad, entonces puede haber buenas razones para ser
particularistas o, más bien, para otorgar prioridad a la experiencia frente a la
mera forma y la técnica
For many, markets are the most efficient
way in general to organize production and distribution in a complex economy. But
what about those markets we might label noxious--markets in addictive drugs,
say, or in sex? In Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, philosopher Debra
Satz takes a penetrating look at those commodity exchanges that strike most of
us as problematic. What considerations, she asks, ought to guide the debates
about such markets? Satz contends that categories previously used by
philosophers and economists are of limited use in addressing such markets
because they are assumed to be homogenous. Accordingly, she offers a broader and
more nuanced view of markets--one that goes beyond the usual discussions of
efficiency and distributional equality--to show how markets shape our culture,
foster or thwart human development, and create and support structures of power.
Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow calls this book "a work that will have to be
studied and taken account of by all those concerned by the role of the market as
compared with other social mechanisms."
What is a fair distribution of resources
and other goods when individuals are partly responsible for their achievements?
This book develops a theory of fairness incorporating a concern for personal
responsibility, opportunities and freedom. With a critical perspective, it makes
accessible the recent developments in economics and philosophy that define
social justice in terms of equal opportunities. It also proposes new
perspectives and original ideas. The book separates mathematical sections from
the rest of the text, so that the main concepts and ideas are easily accessible
to non-technical readers. It is often thought that responsibility is a complex
notion, but this monograph proposes a simple analytical framework that makes it
possible to disentangle the different concepts of fairness that deal with
neutralizing inequalities for which the individuals are not held responsible,
rewarding their effort, respecting their choices, or staying neutral with
respect to their responsibility sphere. It dwells on paradoxes and
impossibilities only as a way to highlight important ethical options and always
proposes solutions and reasonable compromises among the conflicting values
surrounding equality and responsibility. The theory is able to incorporate
disincentive problems and is illustrated in the examination of applied policy
issues such as: income redistribution when individuals may be held responsible
for their choices of labor supply or education; social and private insurance
when individuals may be held responsible for their risky lifestyle; second
chance policies; the measurement of inequality of opportunities and social
mobility.
Che cosa è un partito e a cosa serve,
oggi? In tutto l'Occidente soffiano venti di protesta e disaffezione nei suoi
confronti. "Il cahiers de doléances" è molto lungo. I partiti non interpretano
più le opinioni dei cittadini, pensano solo ai loro interessi, sono corrotti
inefficienti e incapaci, sono ferri vecchi ereditati da un passato lontano,
morto e sepolto, creano solo disordine e divisione. Non sono accuse nuove.
Risuonano più o meno dalla loro nascita. I partiti hanno sempre creato una sorta
di ansia sociale. Perché dividevano il corpo sociale, creavano passioni spesso
incontenibili e portavano a conflitti rovinosi. Insomma, i partiti erano e sono
tuttora considerati all'origine di tutti i mali. Eppure non c'è scampo: senza
partiti non c'è democrazia. Se vogliamo un sistema pluralista e democratico
dobbiamo "tenerci" dei partiti. Questo libro sostiene che i partiti non solo
rimangono strumenti ineludibili per l'organizzazione del consenso e la scelta
dei rappresentanti, ma sono oggi più "forti" di un tempo. Sono in ritirata sul
territorio dove hanno perso quasi ovunque iscritti e chiuso sedi; al contempo,
però, hanno accentrato e verticalizzato le loro risorse nelle strutture centrali
nazionali e nelle assemblee rappresentative. Oggi dispongono, nei quartieri
generali e nei gruppi parlamentari e consiliari, di una quantità di personale,
strutture e finanziamenti molto superiore al passato...
Why has median income stopped rising in
the US? Why is the share of population that is working falling so rapidly? Why
are our economy and society are becoming more unequal? A popular explanation
right now is that the root cause underlying these symptoms is technological
stagnation-- a slowdown in the kinds of ideas and inventions that bring progress
and prosperity. In Race Against the Machine, MIT's Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew
McAfee present a very different explanation. Drawing on research by their team
at the Center for Digital Business, they show that there's been no stagnation in
technology -- in fact, the digital revolution is accelerating. Recent advances
are the stuff of science fiction: computers now drive cars in traffic, translate
between human languages effectively, and beat the best human Jeopardy! players.
As these examples show, digital technologies are rapidly encroaching on skills
that used to belong to humans alone. This phenomenon is both broad and deep, and
has profound economic implications. Many of these implications are positive;
digital innovation increases productivity, reduces prices (sometimes to zero),
and grows the overall economic pie. But digital innovation has also changed how
the economic pie is distributed, and here the news is not good for the median
worker. As technology races ahead, it can leave many people behind. Workers
whose skills have been mastered by computers have less to offer the job market,
and see their wages and prospects shrink. Entrepreneurial business models, new
organizational structures and different institutions are needed to ensure that
the average worker is not left behind by cutting-edge machines. In Race Against
the Machine Brynjolfsson and McAfee bring together a range of statistics,
examples, and arguments to show that technological progress is accelerating, and
that this trend has deep consequences for skills, wages, and jobs. The book
makes the case that employment prospects are grim for many today not because
there's been technology has stagnated, but instead because we humans and our
organizations aren't keeping up.
As neuroscientific technologies continue
to develop and inform our understanding of the mind, the opportunities for
applying neuroscience in legal proceedings have also increased. Cognitive
neuroscientists have deepened our understanding of the complex relationship
between the mind and the brain by using new techniques such as functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG). The
inferences drawn from these findings and increasingly sophisticated technologies
are being applied to debates and processes in the legal field, from lie
detection in criminal trials to critical legal doctrines surrounding the
insanity defense or guilt adjudication. In Minds, Brains, and Law: The
Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, Michael S. Pardo and Dennis
Patterson assess the philosophical questions that arise when neuroscientific
research and technology are applied in the legal system. They examine the
arguments favoring the increased use of neuroscience in law, the means for
assessing its reliability in legal proceedings, and the integration of
neuroscientific research into substantive legal doctrines. The authors use their
explorations to inform a corrective inquiry into the mistaken inferences and
conceptual errors that arise from mismatched concepts, such as the mental
disconnect of what constitutes "lying" on a lie detection test. The empirical,
practical, ethical, and conceptual issues that Pardo and Patterson seek to
redress will deeply influence how we negotiate and implement the fruits of
neuroscience in law and policy in the future.| Cerca Copia |