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volume II
terza edizione
Autori : Agostino Gambino, Daniele U. Santosuosso
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 Non è la bacchetta magica, ma un moderno 
sistema di valutazione può aiutare la scuola italiana a rinnovarsi, evitando i 
rischi di declino. Come? Fornendo analisi per capire le debolezze del nostro 
sistema d'istruzione e le ragioni dei suoi ritardi. Offrendo a ciascuna scuola 
strumenti di diagnosi per fare meglio il proprio lavoro e migliorare i risultati 
degli studenti. Infine, mettendo a disposizione delle famiglie efficaci bussole 
per orientarsi. Ne è convinta la Fondazione Agnelli, che arriva a questo 
rapporto dopo un lungo percorso di ricerca. Non mancano certo i dilemmi da 
affrontare. Chi valutare? I singoli docenti, le scuole, il sistema scolastico 
nel suo complesso? Con quali strumenti? Quale uso fare dei risultati della 
valutazione? E, soprattutto, come costruire il consenso e guadagnare la fiducia 
degli insegnanti, superandone le resistenze? Un quadro della valutazione della 
scuola in Italia e le soluzioni possibili, a partire dalle evidenze che vengono 
dalla ricerca, dall'esperienza internazionale e dalle sperimentazioni 
nazionali.
Non è la bacchetta magica, ma un moderno 
sistema di valutazione può aiutare la scuola italiana a rinnovarsi, evitando i 
rischi di declino. Come? Fornendo analisi per capire le debolezze del nostro 
sistema d'istruzione e le ragioni dei suoi ritardi. Offrendo a ciascuna scuola 
strumenti di diagnosi per fare meglio il proprio lavoro e migliorare i risultati 
degli studenti. Infine, mettendo a disposizione delle famiglie efficaci bussole 
per orientarsi. Ne è convinta la Fondazione Agnelli, che arriva a questo 
rapporto dopo un lungo percorso di ricerca. Non mancano certo i dilemmi da 
affrontare. Chi valutare? I singoli docenti, le scuole, il sistema scolastico 
nel suo complesso? Con quali strumenti? Quale uso fare dei risultati della 
valutazione? E, soprattutto, come costruire il consenso e guadagnare la fiducia 
degli insegnanti, superandone le resistenze? Un quadro della valutazione della 
scuola in Italia e le soluzioni possibili, a partire dalle evidenze che vengono 
dalla ricerca, dall'esperienza internazionale e dalle sperimentazioni 
nazionali.| Cerca Copia | 
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 What is discrimination? There are certain 
instances of differential treatment that almost anyone would describe as 
discriminatory; yet upon deeper examination, this near-unanimity gives way to 
disagreement and difference. For instance, is it discrimination when hospitals 
hire non-smokers only? Not only do people differ on which cases of differential 
treatment they see as discriminatory, they also disagree about when 
discrimination is morally wrong; what makes it morally wrong; and, indeed, about 
whether all forms of discrimination are morally wrong! Finally, many disagree 
over what should be done about wrongful discrimination-especially about what the 
state could permissibly do to eliminate wrongful discrimination, e.g. in 
people's love lives. This book addresses these issues. It argues that there are 
different concepts of discrimination and that different purposes pertaining to 
different contexts determine which one is the most useful. It gives special 
attention to a concept of discrimination that ties discrimination to 
differential treatment of people on the basis of their membership in socially 
salient groups. Second, it argues that when discrimination is wrong, it is so 
first and foremost because of its harmful effects. Third, it takes issue with 
some of the standard devices used to counteract discrimination and submits that 
combating discrimination requires more than state actions. Finally, it argues 
that states may sometimes permissibly discriminate. "[Lippert-Rasmussen] is a 
master of advancing discussion on a topic by showing that where the rest of us 
saw only two or three possible positions, there are many positions, often 
smeared together in a confused way in prior writings on the topic. The different 
views need to be carefully distinguished, and we then need to look carefully at 
what can be said for and against each in turn. When we do this, our view of the 
issues significantly shifts. This method and its fruits are evident throughout 
the bookEL [The] author's analytical skill and creative imagination in following 
through this method make the book a pleasure to read." -Richard J. Arneson, 
Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego
What is discrimination? There are certain 
instances of differential treatment that almost anyone would describe as 
discriminatory; yet upon deeper examination, this near-unanimity gives way to 
disagreement and difference. For instance, is it discrimination when hospitals 
hire non-smokers only? Not only do people differ on which cases of differential 
treatment they see as discriminatory, they also disagree about when 
discrimination is morally wrong; what makes it morally wrong; and, indeed, about 
whether all forms of discrimination are morally wrong! Finally, many disagree 
over what should be done about wrongful discrimination-especially about what the 
state could permissibly do to eliminate wrongful discrimination, e.g. in 
people's love lives. This book addresses these issues. It argues that there are 
different concepts of discrimination and that different purposes pertaining to 
different contexts determine which one is the most useful. It gives special 
attention to a concept of discrimination that ties discrimination to 
differential treatment of people on the basis of their membership in socially 
salient groups. Second, it argues that when discrimination is wrong, it is so 
first and foremost because of its harmful effects. Third, it takes issue with 
some of the standard devices used to counteract discrimination and submits that 
combating discrimination requires more than state actions. Finally, it argues 
that states may sometimes permissibly discriminate. "[Lippert-Rasmussen] is a 
master of advancing discussion on a topic by showing that where the rest of us 
saw only two or three possible positions, there are many positions, often 
smeared together in a confused way in prior writings on the topic. The different 
views need to be carefully distinguished, and we then need to look carefully at 
what can be said for and against each in turn. When we do this, our view of the 
issues significantly shifts. This method and its fruits are evident throughout 
the bookEL [The] author's analytical skill and creative imagination in following 
through this method make the book a pleasure to read." -Richard J. Arneson, 
Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego Las afirmaciones del tipo «matar está mal» o «Pedro debe responder por el mal 
causado» suelen ser sometidas a escrutinio exigiendo su justificación. Según una 
concepción arraigada en el terreno práctico y que se denomina «universalismo», 
los juicios o acciones prácticas están justificadas sólo si constituyen el 
seguimiento o aplicación de un parámetro, regla o principio de cierto tipo. El 
universalismo es objetado de dos maneras. Por un lado por el escepticismo, para 
el cual nunca tiene sentido hablar de afirmaciones o acciones justificadas. Por 
el otro por el particularismo, para el que puede hablarse de acciones o 
afirmaciones justificadas aunque no impliquen la aplicación de un principio o 
regla. Según el particularista ninguna regla o principio pueden ser lo 
suficientemente atentos o receptivos a la complejidad de los casos sobre los que 
habrá que decidir. La discusión entre universalismo, escepticismo y 
particularismo se proyecta directamente en el plano del derecho. En el terreno 
del derecho se puede sostener o bien que la decisión de un juez está justificada 
sólo si se basa en una regla o principio general, o bien que nunca está 
justificada, o bien que puede existir una justificación jurídica a pesar de que 
la decisión no se base en una regla o principio. Este libro analiza la discusión 
entre universalismo, escepticismo y particularismo y su proyección en la teoría 
del derecho. Se pretende defender una variante del particularismo abordando en 
tono crítico los postulados de la filosofía analítica clásica. Si se concede que 
nuestro conocimiento es necesariamente parcial y algunas veces verdadero, y se 
acepta la existencia de libertad, entonces puede haber buenas razones para ser 
particularistas o, más bien, para otorgar prioridad a la experiencia frente a la 
mera forma y la técnica
Las afirmaciones del tipo «matar está mal» o «Pedro debe responder por el mal 
causado» suelen ser sometidas a escrutinio exigiendo su justificación. Según una 
concepción arraigada en el terreno práctico y que se denomina «universalismo», 
los juicios o acciones prácticas están justificadas sólo si constituyen el 
seguimiento o aplicación de un parámetro, regla o principio de cierto tipo. El 
universalismo es objetado de dos maneras. Por un lado por el escepticismo, para 
el cual nunca tiene sentido hablar de afirmaciones o acciones justificadas. Por 
el otro por el particularismo, para el que puede hablarse de acciones o 
afirmaciones justificadas aunque no impliquen la aplicación de un principio o 
regla. Según el particularista ninguna regla o principio pueden ser lo 
suficientemente atentos o receptivos a la complejidad de los casos sobre los que 
habrá que decidir. La discusión entre universalismo, escepticismo y 
particularismo se proyecta directamente en el plano del derecho. En el terreno 
del derecho se puede sostener o bien que la decisión de un juez está justificada 
sólo si se basa en una regla o principio general, o bien que nunca está 
justificada, o bien que puede existir una justificación jurídica a pesar de que 
la decisión no se base en una regla o principio. Este libro analiza la discusión 
entre universalismo, escepticismo y particularismo y su proyección en la teoría 
del derecho. Se pretende defender una variante del particularismo abordando en 
tono crítico los postulados de la filosofía analítica clásica. Si se concede que 
nuestro conocimiento es necesariamente parcial y algunas veces verdadero, y se 
acepta la existencia de libertad, entonces puede haber buenas razones para ser 
particularistas o, más bien, para otorgar prioridad a la experiencia frente a la 
mera forma y la técnica For many, markets are the most efficient 
way in general to organize production and distribution in a complex economy. But 
what about those markets we might label noxious--markets in addictive drugs, 
say, or in sex? In Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, philosopher Debra 
Satz takes a penetrating look at those commodity exchanges that strike most of 
us as problematic. What considerations, she asks, ought to guide the debates 
about such markets? Satz contends that categories previously used by 
philosophers and economists are of limited use in addressing such markets 
because they are assumed to be homogenous. Accordingly, she offers a broader and 
more nuanced view of markets--one that goes beyond the usual discussions of 
efficiency and distributional equality--to show how markets shape our culture, 
foster or thwart human development, and create and support structures of power. 
Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow calls this book "a work that will have to be 
studied and taken account of by all those concerned by the role of the market as 
compared with other social mechanisms."
For many, markets are the most efficient 
way in general to organize production and distribution in a complex economy. But 
what about those markets we might label noxious--markets in addictive drugs, 
say, or in sex? In Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, philosopher Debra 
Satz takes a penetrating look at those commodity exchanges that strike most of 
us as problematic. What considerations, she asks, ought to guide the debates 
about such markets? Satz contends that categories previously used by 
philosophers and economists are of limited use in addressing such markets 
because they are assumed to be homogenous. Accordingly, she offers a broader and 
more nuanced view of markets--one that goes beyond the usual discussions of 
efficiency and distributional equality--to show how markets shape our culture, 
foster or thwart human development, and create and support structures of power. 
Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow calls this book "a work that will have to be 
studied and taken account of by all those concerned by the role of the market as 
compared with other social mechanisms." What is a fair distribution of resources 
and other goods when individuals are partly responsible for their achievements? 
This book develops a theory of fairness incorporating a concern for personal 
responsibility, opportunities and freedom. With a critical perspective, it makes 
accessible the recent developments in economics and philosophy that define 
social justice in terms of equal opportunities. It also proposes new 
perspectives and original ideas. The book separates mathematical sections from 
the rest of the text, so that the main concepts and ideas are easily accessible 
to non-technical readers. It is often thought that responsibility is a complex 
notion, but this monograph proposes a simple analytical framework that makes it 
possible to disentangle the different concepts of fairness that deal with 
neutralizing inequalities for which the individuals are not held responsible, 
rewarding their effort, respecting their choices, or staying neutral with 
respect to their responsibility sphere. It dwells on paradoxes and 
impossibilities only as a way to highlight important ethical options and always 
proposes solutions and reasonable compromises among the conflicting values 
surrounding equality and responsibility. The theory is able to incorporate 
disincentive problems and is illustrated in the examination of applied policy 
issues such as: income redistribution when individuals may be held responsible 
for their choices of labor supply or education; social and private insurance 
when individuals may be held responsible for their risky lifestyle; second 
chance policies; the measurement of inequality of opportunities and social 
mobility.
What is a fair distribution of resources 
and other goods when individuals are partly responsible for their achievements? 
This book develops a theory of fairness incorporating a concern for personal 
responsibility, opportunities and freedom. With a critical perspective, it makes 
accessible the recent developments in economics and philosophy that define 
social justice in terms of equal opportunities. It also proposes new 
perspectives and original ideas. The book separates mathematical sections from 
the rest of the text, so that the main concepts and ideas are easily accessible 
to non-technical readers. It is often thought that responsibility is a complex 
notion, but this monograph proposes a simple analytical framework that makes it 
possible to disentangle the different concepts of fairness that deal with 
neutralizing inequalities for which the individuals are not held responsible, 
rewarding their effort, respecting their choices, or staying neutral with 
respect to their responsibility sphere. It dwells on paradoxes and 
impossibilities only as a way to highlight important ethical options and always 
proposes solutions and reasonable compromises among the conflicting values 
surrounding equality and responsibility. The theory is able to incorporate 
disincentive problems and is illustrated in the examination of applied policy 
issues such as: income redistribution when individuals may be held responsible 
for their choices of labor supply or education; social and private insurance 
when individuals may be held responsible for their risky lifestyle; second 
chance policies; the measurement of inequality of opportunities and social 
mobility.
 Che cosa è un partito e a cosa serve, 
oggi? In tutto l'Occidente soffiano venti di protesta e disaffezione nei suoi 
confronti. "Il cahiers de doléances" è molto lungo. I partiti non interpretano 
più le opinioni dei cittadini, pensano solo ai loro interessi, sono corrotti 
inefficienti e incapaci, sono ferri vecchi ereditati da un passato lontano, 
morto e sepolto, creano solo disordine e divisione. Non sono accuse nuove. 
Risuonano più o meno dalla loro nascita. I partiti hanno sempre creato una sorta 
di ansia sociale. Perché dividevano il corpo sociale, creavano passioni spesso 
incontenibili e portavano a conflitti rovinosi. Insomma, i partiti erano e sono 
tuttora considerati all'origine di tutti i mali. Eppure non c'è scampo: senza 
partiti non c'è democrazia. Se vogliamo un sistema pluralista e democratico 
dobbiamo "tenerci" dei partiti. Questo libro sostiene che i partiti non solo 
rimangono strumenti ineludibili per l'organizzazione del consenso e la scelta 
dei rappresentanti, ma sono oggi più "forti" di un tempo. Sono in ritirata sul 
territorio dove hanno perso quasi ovunque iscritti e chiuso sedi; al contempo, 
però, hanno accentrato e verticalizzato le loro risorse nelle strutture centrali 
nazionali e nelle assemblee rappresentative. Oggi dispongono, nei quartieri 
generali e nei gruppi parlamentari e consiliari, di una quantità di personale, 
strutture e finanziamenti molto superiore al passato...
Che cosa è un partito e a cosa serve, 
oggi? In tutto l'Occidente soffiano venti di protesta e disaffezione nei suoi 
confronti. "Il cahiers de doléances" è molto lungo. I partiti non interpretano 
più le opinioni dei cittadini, pensano solo ai loro interessi, sono corrotti 
inefficienti e incapaci, sono ferri vecchi ereditati da un passato lontano, 
morto e sepolto, creano solo disordine e divisione. Non sono accuse nuove. 
Risuonano più o meno dalla loro nascita. I partiti hanno sempre creato una sorta 
di ansia sociale. Perché dividevano il corpo sociale, creavano passioni spesso 
incontenibili e portavano a conflitti rovinosi. Insomma, i partiti erano e sono 
tuttora considerati all'origine di tutti i mali. Eppure non c'è scampo: senza 
partiti non c'è democrazia. Se vogliamo un sistema pluralista e democratico 
dobbiamo "tenerci" dei partiti. Questo libro sostiene che i partiti non solo 
rimangono strumenti ineludibili per l'organizzazione del consenso e la scelta 
dei rappresentanti, ma sono oggi più "forti" di un tempo. Sono in ritirata sul 
territorio dove hanno perso quasi ovunque iscritti e chiuso sedi; al contempo, 
però, hanno accentrato e verticalizzato le loro risorse nelle strutture centrali 
nazionali e nelle assemblee rappresentative. Oggi dispongono, nei quartieri 
generali e nei gruppi parlamentari e consiliari, di una quantità di personale, 
strutture e finanziamenti molto superiore al passato... Why has median income stopped rising in 
the US? Why is the share of population that is working falling so rapidly? Why 
are our economy and society are becoming more unequal? A popular explanation 
right now is that the root cause underlying these symptoms is technological 
stagnation-- a slowdown in the kinds of ideas and inventions that bring progress 
and prosperity. In Race Against the Machine, MIT's Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew 
McAfee present a very different explanation. Drawing on research by their team 
at the Center for Digital Business, they show that there's been no stagnation in 
technology -- in fact, the digital revolution is accelerating. Recent advances 
are the stuff of science fiction: computers now drive cars in traffic, translate 
between human languages effectively, and beat the best human Jeopardy! players. 
As these examples show, digital technologies are rapidly encroaching on skills 
that used to belong to humans alone. This phenomenon is both broad and deep, and 
has profound economic implications. Many of these implications are positive; 
digital innovation increases productivity, reduces prices (sometimes to zero), 
and grows the overall economic pie. But digital innovation has also changed how 
the economic pie is distributed, and here the news is not good for the median 
worker. As technology races ahead, it can leave many people behind. Workers 
whose skills have been mastered by computers have less to offer the job market, 
and see their wages and prospects shrink. Entrepreneurial business models, new 
organizational structures and different institutions are needed to ensure that 
the average worker is not left behind by cutting-edge machines. In Race Against 
the Machine Brynjolfsson and McAfee bring together a range of statistics, 
examples, and arguments to show that technological progress is accelerating, and 
that this trend has deep consequences for skills, wages, and jobs. The book 
makes the case that employment prospects are grim for many today not because 
there's been technology has stagnated, but instead because we humans and our 
organizations aren't keeping up.
Why has median income stopped rising in 
the US? Why is the share of population that is working falling so rapidly? Why 
are our economy and society are becoming more unequal? A popular explanation 
right now is that the root cause underlying these symptoms is technological 
stagnation-- a slowdown in the kinds of ideas and inventions that bring progress 
and prosperity. In Race Against the Machine, MIT's Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew 
McAfee present a very different explanation. Drawing on research by their team 
at the Center for Digital Business, they show that there's been no stagnation in 
technology -- in fact, the digital revolution is accelerating. Recent advances 
are the stuff of science fiction: computers now drive cars in traffic, translate 
between human languages effectively, and beat the best human Jeopardy! players. 
As these examples show, digital technologies are rapidly encroaching on skills 
that used to belong to humans alone. This phenomenon is both broad and deep, and 
has profound economic implications. Many of these implications are positive; 
digital innovation increases productivity, reduces prices (sometimes to zero), 
and grows the overall economic pie. But digital innovation has also changed how 
the economic pie is distributed, and here the news is not good for the median 
worker. As technology races ahead, it can leave many people behind. Workers 
whose skills have been mastered by computers have less to offer the job market, 
and see their wages and prospects shrink. Entrepreneurial business models, new 
organizational structures and different institutions are needed to ensure that 
the average worker is not left behind by cutting-edge machines. In Race Against 
the Machine Brynjolfsson and McAfee bring together a range of statistics, 
examples, and arguments to show that technological progress is accelerating, and 
that this trend has deep consequences for skills, wages, and jobs. The book 
makes the case that employment prospects are grim for many today not because 
there's been technology has stagnated, but instead because we humans and our 
organizations aren't keeping up. As neuroscientific technologies continue 
to develop and inform our understanding of the mind, the opportunities for 
applying neuroscience in legal proceedings have also increased. Cognitive 
neuroscientists have deepened our understanding of the complex relationship 
between the mind and the brain by using new techniques such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG). The 
inferences drawn from these findings and increasingly sophisticated technologies 
are being applied to debates and processes in the legal field, from lie 
detection in criminal trials to critical legal doctrines surrounding the 
insanity defense or guilt adjudication. In Minds, Brains, and Law: The 
Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, Michael S. Pardo and Dennis 
Patterson assess the philosophical questions that arise when neuroscientific 
research and technology are applied in the legal system. They examine the 
arguments favoring the increased use of neuroscience in law, the means for 
assessing its reliability in legal proceedings, and the integration of 
neuroscientific research into substantive legal doctrines. The authors use their 
explorations to inform a corrective inquiry into the mistaken inferences and 
conceptual errors that arise from mismatched concepts, such as the mental 
disconnect of what constitutes "lying" on a lie detection test. The empirical, 
practical, ethical, and conceptual issues that Pardo and Patterson seek to 
redress will deeply influence how we negotiate and implement the fruits of 
neuroscience in law and policy in the future.
As neuroscientific technologies continue 
to develop and inform our understanding of the mind, the opportunities for 
applying neuroscience in legal proceedings have also increased. Cognitive 
neuroscientists have deepened our understanding of the complex relationship 
between the mind and the brain by using new techniques such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG). The 
inferences drawn from these findings and increasingly sophisticated technologies 
are being applied to debates and processes in the legal field, from lie 
detection in criminal trials to critical legal doctrines surrounding the 
insanity defense or guilt adjudication. In Minds, Brains, and Law: The 
Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, Michael S. Pardo and Dennis 
Patterson assess the philosophical questions that arise when neuroscientific 
research and technology are applied in the legal system. They examine the 
arguments favoring the increased use of neuroscience in law, the means for 
assessing its reliability in legal proceedings, and the integration of 
neuroscientific research into substantive legal doctrines. The authors use their 
explorations to inform a corrective inquiry into the mistaken inferences and 
conceptual errors that arise from mismatched concepts, such as the mental 
disconnect of what constitutes "lying" on a lie detection test. The empirical, 
practical, ethical, and conceptual issues that Pardo and Patterson seek to 
redress will deeply influence how we negotiate and implement the fruits of 
neuroscience in law and policy in the future.| Cerca Copia |