Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology
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| Anteprima |
Rik Peels - Oxford University Press, 2017
What
we believe and what we do not believe has a great impact on what we do
and fail to do. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe
responsibly. However, do we have the kind of control over our beliefs
that such responsibility for our beliefs seems to require? Do we have
certain obligations to control or influence our beliefs on particular
occasions? And do we sometimes believe responsibly despite violating
such obligations, namely because we are excused by, say, indoctrination
or ignorance? By answering each of these questions, Rik Peels
provides a theory of what it is to believe responsibly. He argues that
we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence
our beliefs by performing actions that make a difference to what we
believe. We have a wide variety of moral, prudential, and epistemic
obligations to perform such belief-influencing actions. We can be held
responsible for our beliefs in virtue of such influence on our beliefs.
Sometimes, we believe responsibly despite having violated such
obligations, namely if we are excused, by force, ignorance, or luck. A
careful consideration of these excuses teaches us, respectively, that
responsible belief entails that we could have failed to have that
belief, that responsible belief is in a specific sense radically
subjective, and that responsible belief is compatible with its being a
matter of luck that we hold that belief.
