Commonsense Consequentialism:
Wherein Morality Meets Rationality
Commonsense
Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the
interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends
a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense
moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the
same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly
construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status
is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the
available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues
that outcomes should be ranked, not according to their impersonal
value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to
desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked
in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can
better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many
forms of deontology can. What's more, Portmore argues that we should
accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept
both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has
most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to
perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most
reason to want to obtain. Although the primary aim of the book is to
defend a particular moral theory (viz., commonsense
consequentialism), Portmore defends this theory as part of a coherent
whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance
of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not
only to those working on consequentialism and other areas of
normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics. Beyond
offering an account of morality, Portmore offers accounts of
practical reasons, practical rationality, and the
objective/subjective obligation distinction.
