Contemporary political and legal theory
typically justifies the value of political and legal institutions on the grounds
that such institutions bring about desirable outcomes - such as justice,
security, and prosperity. In the popular imagination, however, many people seem
to value public institutions for their own sake. The idea that political and
legal institutions might be intrinsically valuable has received little
philosophical attention. Why Law Matters presents the argument that legal
institutions and legal procedures are valuable and matter as such, irrespective
of their instrumental value. Harel advances the argument in several ways.
Firstly, he examines the value of rights. Traditionally it is believed that
rights are valuable because they promote the realisation of values such as
autonomy. Instead Harel argues that the values underlying (some) rights are
partially constructed by entrenching rights. Secondly he argues that the value
of public institutions are not grounded (ONLY) in the contingent fact that such
institutions are particularly accountable to the public. Instead, some goods are
intrinsically public; their value hinges on their public provision. Thirdly he
shows that constitutional directives are not mere contingent instruments to
promote justice. In the absence of constitutional entrenchment of rights,
citizens live "at the mercy of" their legislatures (even if legislatures protect
justice adequately). Lastly, Harel defends judicial review on the grounds that
it is an embodiment of the right to a hearing. The book shows that instrumental
justifications fail to identify what is really valuable about public
institutions and fail to account for their enduring appeal. More specifically
legal theorists fail to be attentive to the sentiments of politicians, citizens
and activists and to theorise public concerns in a way that is responsive to
these sentimentsmercoledì 4 giugno 2014
Sezione Diritto e società
Why Law
Matters
Contemporary political and legal theory
typically justifies the value of political and legal institutions on the grounds
that such institutions bring about desirable outcomes - such as justice,
security, and prosperity. In the popular imagination, however, many people seem
to value public institutions for their own sake. The idea that political and
legal institutions might be intrinsically valuable has received little
philosophical attention. Why Law Matters presents the argument that legal
institutions and legal procedures are valuable and matter as such, irrespective
of their instrumental value. Harel advances the argument in several ways.
Firstly, he examines the value of rights. Traditionally it is believed that
rights are valuable because they promote the realisation of values such as
autonomy. Instead Harel argues that the values underlying (some) rights are
partially constructed by entrenching rights. Secondly he argues that the value
of public institutions are not grounded (ONLY) in the contingent fact that such
institutions are particularly accountable to the public. Instead, some goods are
intrinsically public; their value hinges on their public provision. Thirdly he
shows that constitutional directives are not mere contingent instruments to
promote justice. In the absence of constitutional entrenchment of rights,
citizens live "at the mercy of" their legislatures (even if legislatures protect
justice adequately). Lastly, Harel defends judicial review on the grounds that
it is an embodiment of the right to a hearing. The book shows that instrumental
justifications fail to identify what is really valuable about public
institutions and fail to account for their enduring appeal. More specifically
legal theorists fail to be attentive to the sentiments of politicians, citizens
and activists and to theorise public concerns in a way that is responsive to
these sentiments
Contemporary political and legal theory
typically justifies the value of political and legal institutions on the grounds
that such institutions bring about desirable outcomes - such as justice,
security, and prosperity. In the popular imagination, however, many people seem
to value public institutions for their own sake. The idea that political and
legal institutions might be intrinsically valuable has received little
philosophical attention. Why Law Matters presents the argument that legal
institutions and legal procedures are valuable and matter as such, irrespective
of their instrumental value. Harel advances the argument in several ways.
Firstly, he examines the value of rights. Traditionally it is believed that
rights are valuable because they promote the realisation of values such as
autonomy. Instead Harel argues that the values underlying (some) rights are
partially constructed by entrenching rights. Secondly he argues that the value
of public institutions are not grounded (ONLY) in the contingent fact that such
institutions are particularly accountable to the public. Instead, some goods are
intrinsically public; their value hinges on their public provision. Thirdly he
shows that constitutional directives are not mere contingent instruments to
promote justice. In the absence of constitutional entrenchment of rights,
citizens live "at the mercy of" their legislatures (even if legislatures protect
justice adequately). Lastly, Harel defends judicial review on the grounds that
it is an embodiment of the right to a hearing. The book shows that instrumental
justifications fail to identify what is really valuable about public
institutions and fail to account for their enduring appeal. More specifically
legal theorists fail to be attentive to the sentiments of politicians, citizens
and activists and to theorise public concerns in a way that is responsive to
these sentiments
