It has been frequently argued that democracy is protected and realized under
constitutions that protect certain rights and establish the conditions for a
functioning representative democracy. However, some democrats still find
something profoundly unsettling about contemporary constitutional regimes. The
participation of ordinary citizens in constitutional change in the world's most
"advanced" democracies (such as the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom) is weak at best: the power of constitutional reform usually lies in the
exclusive hands of legislatures. How can constitutions that can only be altered
by those occupying positions of power be considered democratically legitimate?
This book argues that only a regime that provides an outlet for constituent
power to manifest from time to time can ever come to enjoy democratic
legitimacy. In so doing, it advances a democratic constitutional theory, one
that combines a strong or participatory conception of democracy with a weak form
of constitutionalism. The author engages with Anglo-American constitutional
theory as well as examining the theory and practise of constituent power in
different constitutional regimes (including Latin American countries) where
constituent power has become an important part of the left's legal and political
discourse. Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of
Constituent Power will be of particular interest to legal/political theorists
and comparative constitutional lawyers. It also provides an introduction to the
theory of constituent power and its relationship to constitutionalism and
democracy
