Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy
 |
| Vai alla copia |
How is the United States able to control
the IMF with only 17% of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy
made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explain how
international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal
rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to
exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are
therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and
interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model
of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO and EU, Stone argues that
institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He
shows that US interests influence the size, terms and enforcement of IMF
programs, and new data, archival documents and interviews reveal the
shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia and
Argentina.
